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The logo for Benaissance International Foundation, featuring the word "Benaissance" in a stylized, cursive font with a green swirl around the letter 'B'.
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The Government Policy

Parliamentary elections in Ukraine were held according to democratic standards. They have given a popular mandate to pro-European democratic parties, which pledged to implement much-needed reforms. The creation of coalition will also follow new rules which are to be agreed by leading coalition members. This parliament will not be able to scapegoat others for the absence of reforms. For this reason, a new parliament should assume full responsibility for any, even unpopular, state decisions. They may lose public approval rating, but only in this way they can lay foundation for irrevocable changes in public administration. Having done that, pro-democratic parties will provide a springboard for a new political elite, free of corruption and with no links to the old regime.

Under dramatic reversals in coalition formation, the government should keep in mind the upcoming elections in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic, which are scheduled for November 2, 2014. These elections will allow separatists to create their own quasi-state institutions and will help play out the "Transnistria scenario" in Donbas. Ukrainian government should decide how it is going to counter such scenarios, especially in view of Petro Poroshenko's "peace plan", according to which local elections in Donbas have to meet Ukrainian legislation. This clause of the President's peace plan will probably apply only to those districts of Donbas which are now controlled by Ukrainian government.

Coalition: ongoing battle about coalition standards



The keynote of political life in November will become a discussion over the format of future parliamentary coalition. The President favours the broadest format of parliamentary majority. Prior to the elections, Petro Poroshenko's team hoped to become a leading force in the coalition and create a constitutional majority. Due to "People's

The President will have to make more political concessions

Front" and "Samopomich" (Self-Reliance Party) high voting results, Ukrainian President will have to make more political concessions than he expected.

The most positive moment about the elections is that pro-European democratic parties, which pledged to promote reforms and use the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as a road map for changes, have won absolute majority. If earlier Ukrainian government could use resistance of for-

mer members of the Party of Regions as an excuse for lack of reforms, now it is Ukrainian President and Prime Minister that have the carte blanche.

At the same time, the biggest risk is that “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko” and “People’s Front” will not be able to give up their ambitions and they will channel their energy into mutual political infighting instead of reform implementation.

If in one or two years they fail to make significant progress at least in some urgent reforms, such as justice or constitutional ones, leading political parties may promptly lose public support, face mass protests and necessity for snap elections. Under the most positive scenario, the coalition could take responsibility for the implementation of the key reforms and hold next elections under new voting rules, which would allow for reset of the entire political system in Ukraine. Electoral reform should include introduction of proportional representation system with open lists, inescapable punishment for electoral fraud and transparent rules for election campaign finance.

On October 26, 2014, Yuriy Lutsenko, the leader of “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko”, stated that

Without reforms, the leading parties will soon lose public support

the coalition agreement will contain a shortened version of President’s program “Strategy-2020” as well as a schedule when draft laws related to the “Strategy-2020” should be approved. It is unlikely that “People’s Front” will take on such precise obligations, especially under the President’s reform program. Arseniy Yatseniuk already presented his text of the coalition agreement, which contained 36 draft laws to be adopted in the parliament by the end of this year.

According to the preliminary President’s coalition agreement, workings bodies of the coalition include Coalition Assembly and Council. The Coalition Council will be formed under “one representative per 15 faction deputies” principle, whereas leaders of coalition factions will become co-chairmen of the Council.

The President proposed to create working bodies of the coalition

It is important that the main political parties stress the need to get rid of party quotas. However, there is dissonance between such declarations and “People’s Front” ambitions as regards a number of ministerial posts. In turn, the President’s variant of the coalition agreement excludes the quota principle to be applied in the appointment of deputy ministers.

Challenges of separatists’ elections

Parliamentary elections in Ukraine were conducted according to democratic standards. Ukrainian law enforcement bodies managed to avert possible provocations. Electoral fraud was not systemic, though some activists claimed that there were some violations in certain single-member constituencies in Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Luhansk regions.

What is more worrisome is that Ukrainian government is ignoring the fact that separatists prepare elections in Donbas for November 2, 2014. Russia’s support for these elections will somewhat legitimize leadership of the self-proclaimed republics in Ukraine’s East and poses a risk of Donbas becoming “Ukrainian Transnistria”. For the time being, Ukrainian government has failed to explain how it is going to counteract this scenario. Official government position is just about ignoring these elections as ones that do not comply with Ukrainian legislation.

Ukrainian government ignores the preparation of elections in separatist-held area

Ukrainian President and Prime Minister have not come up with any information policy in this regard. There is no counter-propaganda campaign to neutralize separatist initiatives, as it was the case with the May referendum in Donbas. Ukrainian government does nothing to explain to the public what possible repercussions their participation in the elections and further freezing of the conflict will have.

Donbas elections may have an immense negative impact on Ukrainian central authorities. The Kremlin have already used this episode to destabilize situation in Ukraine by announcing that these elections were one of secret clauses in Minsk agreements. In addition, representatives of separatist republics have been trying to create their own quasi-state institutions for quite a long time. Elections, even fictitious ones, will only accelerate this process.

Elections will speed up creation of quasi-state institutions

Economic Situation

The NBU reports deterioration of economic situation in Ukraine, which results in negative dynamics of major macroeconomic indicators, namely in foreign trade and industrial production. Overall situation in production was slightly improved by growth in agriculture and food industry.

Donbas territories occupied by terrorists are

the major debtors for the gas consumed. Terrorists refuse to repay gas debts towards Ukrainian government and hold negotiations on direct supplies of energy resources from Russia. Initiative of some Ukrainian government officials to cut gas supplies to LNR and DNR due to exposure may be considered as recognition of their subjectivity.

Further drop in foreign trade



Every month economic situation in the country deteriorates, which influences dynamics of major macroeconomic indicators, namely in foreign trade and industrial production.

According to the NBU, current account deficit of external balance, which displays export/import dynamics, made up USD 612 mln. in September 2014 comparing to USD 91 mln. in August 2014. In particular, drop in commodity export con-

Current account deficit of external balance made up USD 612 mln. in September 2014

stituted 16.5% p.a., while overall export made up USD 4.4 bln. In September and August 2014 pace of commodity import decrease was similar (40% p.a.), with the import being at the level of USD 4.9 bln.

The worst deterioration of export was observed in machine manufacturing and metallurgy — by 35.6% and 28.9% accordingly. Negative dynamics was caused by destruction of production facilities in the East and suspension of deliveries to

Export dynamics deteriorated due to destruction of infrastructure in the East

Russia due to trade restrictions. At the same time negative trend is slightly mitigated by 8.3% growth in agricultural products export, namely through increase in delivery of crops of a new harvest (by 19.4%), oil and fats (by 58.8%), as well as export of meat products (by 46.4%) to the EU and Iraq.

The NBU data show that non-energy import decrease slowed down from 39.7% to 31.0% due to slower drop of domestic demand. The largest import drop concerned gas — from 4.4 bcm in September 2013 to 1 bcm in September 2014, machine production — from 52.2% to 29.0%, especially cars (from 82.7 to 26.3%), and industrial goods — from 37.1% to 26%. The negative dynamics will continue with hostilities in the East and deterioration in mining, metallurgy and machine production.

Situation with financial account of external balance is much worse. It is the first time since 1991 that Ukraine experience double deficit of external balance, which deteriorates credit standing and international investment position. End of hostilities and recovery of Donbas infrastructure are major pre-requisites to stabilize economic situation.

Positive trends observed by the NBU include slower drop in dynamics of production index for basic industries (hereinafter — PIBI) in September 2014 — down to -0.8% p.a. In August 2014 the index was -12.3%. In January-September 2014 PIBI decreased by 6.3% yoy.

The NBU reported on slower drop in dynamics of PIBI

Significant improvement of PIBI dynamics was caused by increase in agricultural production in September 2014 by 46.9% p.a. 14% increase in crops yielding capacity was a major reason for

positive dynamics in agriculture. At the same time, high rate is explained by low basis for comparison, which is a temporary factor and will not influence following periods.

Agricultural production growth contributed to higher volumes of food production (by 13% p.a.). It led to the fact that industrial production drop slowed down to 16.6% p.a.

However, a difficult situation in the East continues negative influence on other kinds of economic activities. According to the NBU, destruction of transport infrastructure, coal mines and other industrial facilities were the major reasons for the drop in mining (-27.1% p.a.), metallurgy (-28.3%), coke coal and oil refining (-52%).

In particular, situation with coal mining is especially tough. In September 2014 coal mining volumes dropped by 50% yoy. Meanwhile, coke coal production dropped by 76.4% yoy, steam coal — by 43.5%. Lower volumes of coke and steam coal production negatively influences metallurgy and energy sector respectively. It is the first time for a while that Ukraine experiences acute deficit of thermal coal. It is impossible to provide thermal power stations with domestic coal due to hostilities in the East, where most mines are located. Ukraine decided to cover the deficit with import from South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. Yet in short term it will be extremely difficult to cover this deficit, which at the end of 2014 may amount to 5 mln. tons. Taking into account that imported coal is rather expensive, challenges in energy sector will make Ukraine modernize it.

Ukraine experiences acute deficit of steam coal

Ukrainian government: between the rock and the hard place

By September 19, 2014 Ukraine constantly increased gas volumes in its underground gas storage facilities. On October 20, 2014 heating season started in Ukraine, which initiated a reverse process. According to “Ukrtransgaz”, within last week gas volumes decreased from 16.759 bcm to 16.440 bcm,

Heating season started decreasing gas volumes in the Ukrainian storage facilities

or by 2%. It should be noted that out of this amount 5 bcm are impossible to use due to technical reasons (it is so called technical gas needed for transportation). Currently Ukrainian government is holding negotiations with the aggressor state to purchase 4-5 bcm of gas and repay exposure for the gas consumed.

Meanwhile, Donbas terrorists consume Ukrainian gas and refuse to pay for it. LNR and DNR leaders boast that they had started heating season ten

days before the rest of Ukraine did. Separatists repeatedly reported on negotiations with Russia as for gas supplies. Last week they announced that “Donbastransgaz” company will be created to hold negotiations with the Kremlin on gas issues. Last week separatists’ leaders stated the intention to restore Taganrog-Mariupol gas pipeline, which was used in the Soviet times and shut down in 2009. According to gas engineers’ estimates, technical process of Donetsk and Luhansk gas networks separation from a single Ukrainian energy system is difficult, costly and will take 4-5 months.

Moreover, terrorists appropriated 1 bcm of gas stored in Donbas and refuse to pay for it.

Pro-Russian separatists use Ukrainian gas without paying for it

Nowadays Donetsk region, with the gas debt of UAH 4 bln., and Luhansk region, with the debt of UAH 1.2 bln., have the largest gas exposure. At the same time, Donbas remains a major energy consumer in Ukraine.

Under current circumstances Ukrainian government ended up in a very difficult situation as regards gas issue of LNR and DNR. On the one hand, occupied territories are both the largest gas consumers and gas debtors. Besides, leaders of so called LNR and DNR openly negotiate with Russia on direct supplies of gas and put it straight that they will not pay for the Ukrainian gas already consumed.

As a result, Ukrainian government is between the rock and the hard place. On the one hand, if

it continues gas supplies to occupied regions, total losses of state budget will reach UAH 7 bln. p.a., which will undermine financial and economic potential of our country. On the other hand, the Russian political elite may use suspension of energy supplies by Kyiv as an informational pretext to accuse Ukrainian government of “genocide” against local people in the Eastern region.

It is likely that Russian propaganda will use complex humanitarian situation in the region to provoke political crisis in Ukraine, deliberately contrasting East and West. Moreover, Ukraine’s refusal to supply gas to Donbas and transfer of the region to Russian energy balance will, in fact, mean abandonment of the territory and recognition of LNR and DNR as subjects. It is unlikely that the Kremlin would agree to accept destroyed energy infrastructure of Donbas to its energy balance and to make significant investments in recovery of the region. Putin’s goal is to maintain manageable chaos in Eastern Ukraine to undermine development of the whole country. The issue of energy supplies to occupied eastern territories should become a matter of debate in trilateral gas negotiations in Brussels.

Ukrainian government is to take pre-emptive measures to avoid transnistrian scenario when Moldova repays gas debts of Transnistria.

The issue of gas supplies to Donbas should be negotiated in Brussels

Political competition

Parliamentary elections in Ukraine had many surprises that can be explained by uncertainty of a large number of voters, presence of several powerful parties at one electoral field, and low turnout rate at the national level. The most unexpected results are as follows: the first place of “People’s Front” according to the proportional component, significant results of “Opposition bloc”, low results of “Civil Position” and “Strong Ukraine”.

Since “People’s Front” and “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko” have received roughly equal number of votes, plans of the President’s party to become a major driving force of the coalition may undergo some changes. The majority will be at least bipolar, with a high probability that “Samopomich” (Self-reliance) party will join the company of “People’s Front” and “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko”. The result of negotiations between these forces also depends on which party will be able to entice majoritarian MPs.

The President’s party failed to implement a minimum program



Two days before the elections, “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko” expected to receive up to 35% of votes under the proportional system, but the final result was 22%. At the same time, “People’s Front” of Arseniy Yatsenyuk managed to wrest a small, but psychologically important advantage in the tens of thousands of voters. “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko” can count on additional 70 seats, won in the majority districts, and several dozens of independent MPs

The psychological advantage of “People’s Front” over the presidential party

who will cooperate with the presidential political force. Thus, even without independent MPs, Petro Poroshenko may count on more than 130 MPs in the Verkhovna Rada.

Several factors affected a significant drop in pro-presidential party’s rating. First, the overconfidence of Poroshenko’s party team has led to the fact that the campaign was based exclusively on the personal rating of the President. The party’s program almost literally reiterated the Poroshenko’s presidential program, though there have been significant changes in both political and economic life

of the country. Weak candidates were intentionally nominated in a number of majoritarian districts allowing many discredited deputies of the previous convocation to get their seats in the Rada again. In addition, the President's party did not demonstrate the personalities to be delegated to the executive authorities and how the priorities, declared in the "Strategy 2020", are going to be implemented.

Second, some actions of the President during the last two months have negatively affected the positions of "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko". The emphasis on the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Donbas is popular in the society, but the Minsk agreements have become the President's defeat. First of all, this is due to the veiled nature of the Minsk agreements, the prolonged absence of information support for these initiatives on the part of the President's administration, a constant disregard of the peace plan by the militants and the actual cession of a large part of previously liberated territories.

Third, Petro Poroshenko was not tough enough in his appointments. Appointing Vitaliy Yarema as the Prosecutor General in June 2014, Petro Poroshenko jokingly advised him to put three closest friends into prison in order to prove an intention to change the system. Instead, the Prosecutor General not only failed to contribute to the detention of the persons involved in Maidan crimes and separatism in the East, but did not manage to dismiss discredited prosecutors. Those responsible for the tragedy near Ilovaysk have not been punished, and the President dismissed the Minister of Defense Valeriy Heletey just two weeks before the elections. Passive policy of the National

The Minsk protocol has negatively affected the President's positions

Petro Poroshenko was not tough enough in his appointments

Bank of Ukraine as regards supporting the national currency and increasing confidence in the banking system has led to criticism of Valeriya Hontariva expressed by the society, but not the President.

Appointments of the Prosecutor General, the Minister of Defense and Head of the National Bank are within the President's sphere of influence. Miscounts of these three institutions have come to the forefront over the past two months, while activities of the Yatsenyuk's government were satisfactory. Thus, mistakes of the President's protégés cut the rating of the pro-presidential force.

However, positive aspect is that "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko" received an even support across the country. For the first time, the party with such a high result has no clear division between East and West. It may facilitate a dialogue process between various regions of the country and the leading role of the President in this process.

A dangerous tendency for "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko" is that Russia will try to inflate the animosity between the President and the Prime Minister under a scenario used after the Orange revolution. Moscow's statements that it will have counterparts in both the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers, as "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko" is a partner of Russia according to the Minsk agreements, are aimed at reducing the President's support and inciting Arseniy Yatsenyuk's ambitions. Coalition-making will be a test for both "People's Front" and "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko" as regards the ability to reach political agreement, draw conclusions from the experience of 2005-2009 and work together at reforms implementation.

An even support of the President in all regions will allow him establishing dialogue between East and West

Coalition-making is a test for "People's Front" and "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko"

Arseniy Yatsenyuk's jackpot

A trick, which had been successfully used by Petro Poroshenko during the presidential elections, was also applied by the "People's Front". In May 2014 Petro Poroshenko managed to convince the electorate that it was necessary to conduct the elections in one round. This time the "People's Front" has managed to convince the voters that they are electing the Prime Minister and the government's team. In ad-

dition, the program of this party was probably the most specific and had a clear sequence of steps necessary for reforms implementation in the country.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk and former functionaries of "Batkivshchyna" managed to get a classic Yulia Tymoshenko's electorate as of 2009, namely Western

Arseniy Yatsenyuk got Yulia Tymoshenko's electorate

and Central Ukraine. Militaristic rhetoric of the abovementioned team greatly contributed to such a result. However, such geographic references are counterproductive for the country since it contributes to a tug of war between political elites of East and West that has been lasting over a decade.

An aggressive information campaign played into the hands of Yatsenyuk-Turchynov's party. The latter became a leader in television and billboards advertising. Such campaigns are extremely expensive. This raises the question of how the party of current government officials, which was established two months ago and does not have extensive membership network and powerful official sponsors, has managed to cover the cost of such advertising campaign. This fact testifies the need for changes in the electoral legislation towards increasing transparency in funding of political parties and their campaigns.

The party of government officials conducted an extremely expensive campaign

The "People's Front" team includes the Prime Minister, the Parliament's speaker, ministers of internal affairs, social policy, infrastructure, justice etc. During the last week before the elections, they held a number of official trips to the regions, which were covered by the media. Such steps are not prohibited, but they can be interpreted as the use of administrative resources or office abuse.

Although all the winners of the elections insist

on the necessity to abandon quotas during the government's formation, "People's Front" announced which posts it wishes to retain. They include positions of Prime Minister, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Justice, Minister of Finances and Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

"People's Front" announced which posts it wishes to retain

It is quite easy to explain why these positions have been chosen. First, these positions, except for the Minister of Finances, are held by the key functionaries of "People's Front". Second, they are among the most influential ones.

Position of the MIA head counterbalances the President's influence on the Prosecutor General. Furthermore, the reform of law enforcement agencies is determined as a priority and the most urgent to be implemented. The role of the Minister of Justice increased under the law on lustration, since this ministry will coordinate the lustration process. In addition, the Minister will have an influence on elaboration of the concept of constitutional, judicial and police reforms. The Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for the preparation of documents in the government and can block the work of any ministry, which will be headed by people not loyal to Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The Minister of Finances has a leading role in allocation of budget flows during the formation of the state budget.

"Samopomich" as an illustration of demand for new faces

Even powerful information campaign against "Samopomich" (Self-reliance) party during the last weeks before elections failed to affect the party's high rating. The main factors of the party's success include high-quality party list of candidates, well-chosen slogan campaign and focus on reform implementation rather than on government's criticism. The party has managed to link up itself with the positive image of Lviv, as the party leader is Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovyi.

"Samopomich" managed to get part of the electorate of "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko" and "Civil Position". Its result is uniformly distributed throughout

Ukraine, even in South and East that automatically converts it from Lviv regional party into a promising project of national importance.

It is important for the party not to disappoint its voters, which are extremely demanding. Such voters give a chance for the new pro-democracy party every elections, but after the lack of positive results they get disappointed immediately. Similarly, in 2012, citizens who voted against Party of the Regions but did not want to support the conventional opposition, voted in favor

It is important for "Samopomich" not to disappoint its voters

of UDAR and “Svoboda” parties. Some of these people voted in favor of Oleh Lyashko at the presidential elections of 2014. Now it is “Samopomich” that can break a pattern if it is able to promote reform implementation and renunciation of party quotas.

The advantage of “Samopomich” is that Andriy Sadovyi is not going to concede long-term wins for short-term gains. It is likely that he is preparing a successful springboard for the presidential election.

Whatever his true motives are, careful approach to team building, correct messages and the ability to give up own ambitions at the right moment improve the quality of political competition in the country and increase the chances of the party to build up its political weight. Currently, the party will have 33 MPs in the Parliament in order to implement these intentions.

Andriy Sadovyi does a strategic play

“Opposition bloc” keeps hold on the electorate of Party of the Regions

Taking into account that elections were not held in Crimea and the most populous districts of Donbas, 10 percent of the vote for “Opposition bloc” under a proportional component is extremely high result. It proves that there is a significant layer of population, which does not support Kyiv’s actions and despite an aggressive Russia’s policy against Ukraine, supports the establishment of good relations with the aggressor. Such people vote for “our guy” and are not willing to accept pro-European rhetoric, while democratic parties remain a strong irritant for them.

Voters of “Opposition bloc” vote against the current Kyiv authorities

the parliament. Relatively high result and the perception of the party as the main opposition in the parliament create a good ground for their comeback as it was in 2006. The only safeguard that can prevent such a scenario is civil society, which should keep a close look both at the actions of “Opposition bloc” and the government.

“Opposition bloc” may get a springboard for comeback

There are the most odious representatives of the Viktor Yanukovich’s regime in “Opposition bloc”, whereas top of the list includes Rinat Akhmetov’s protégés and members of the gas group of Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin.

The hidden potential of this political power lies in the fact that some former regionals get to the parliament as independent MPs. In general, in the parliament there will be 62 MPs, who voted for so-called “dictatorship” laws of Viktor Yanukovich and are prone to change their political orientation at any time.

Ups and downs of Oleh Lyashko’s Radical Party

As Oleh Lyashko capitalized on his presidential elections voting results to launch a quick parliamentary campaign, many sociologists believed that he would win many votes at parliamentary elections. By depicting himself as a fighter against separatism through the media, Oleh Lyashko exploited ATO victories in July 2014 to improve his public image.

However, after the Minsk protocol was signed and hostilities in Donbas became a second consideration for the public, Oleh Lyashko’s rhetoric lost its topicality.

In addition, at that time Ihor Kolomoiskyi launched a concerted media campaign against Oleh Lyashko and Serhiy Lyovochkin. Kolomoiskyi’s me-

dia campaign delivered a shattering blow to Radical Party's electoral standing, which could not be restored through "Inter" or any other TV channels. In voter's mind, there was established a strong link between Oleh Lyashko and Serhiy Loivochkin, and the politician's anti-oligarch rhetoric only added to his populism.

Ihor Kolomoisky's media campaign was a shattering blow to Radical Party's electoral standing

In the current Parliament, the Radical Party will

have a faction of 22 deputies. Since some representatives of "People's Front" oppose teaming up with the party, it is likely that the Radical Party will be given a role of a secondary opposition. Taking into account that Serhiy Loivochkin holds a majority share in "Opposition bloc", there could be situational cooperation between these parties. At the same time, Oleh Lyashko will try to stay aloof from the "Opposition bloc" and sometimes even fight a political battle against the remnants of the Party of Regions to keep his "radical flair".

Party "rejuvenation" did not help "Batkivshchyna"

Low voting results of "Batkivshchyna" at parliamentary elections indicate that the resignation of Yatseniuk-Turchynov group from "Batkivshchyna" seriously hit the party's standing. The fact that Yulia Tymoshenko's electorate base remained loyal to her during her imprisonment can be explained by successful work of Tymoshenko's team. After creation of the "People's Front", Yulia Tymoshenko was left with a bunch of her old fellows and high personal negative rating.

"Batkivshchyna" declared its intention to join the democratic coalition. However, "Batkivshchyna" may be more constructive when in opposition. By criticizing government policy and voting alongside the parliamentary majority on reforms, the faction

of 19 MPs may weaken the "Opposition bloc" standing in the parliament.

A sharp decline in Tymoshenko's popularity compared to presidential elections shows that the party organization needs changes. The rejuvenation of the "Batkivshchyna" will be fruitless unless power is delegated to the young team. "Batkivshchyna" institution-building, the reduction of populism in political rhetoric and Tymoshenko's giving a floor to her team may improve "Batkivshchyna" electoral standing. Otherwise, it is likely that 26 October parliamentary elections will be the last for Yulia Tymoshenko's party.

The reduction of populism will improve "Batkivshchyna" electoral standing

Those who have not got into parliamentary "boat"

"Svoboda" managed to receive higher support than it was forecast by polls. The main reason lies in discipline of ideological electorate, which votes for right-wing parties, as well as in a well-developed regional network. Still, its result was not enough to make it to the parliament though the exit polls were promising. Nevertheless, "Svoboda" will have six MPs who won in single-mandate districts. Besides, the party is represented at the local level

"Svoboda" prospects will depend on proactivity of other right-wing parties

in Western Ukraine and Kyiv. "Svoboda" prospects will depend on proactivity of other right-wing parties, especially "Right Sector".

"Civil Position" did a successful start of election campaign, with the support of 9% and status of "new faces" due to cooperation with "Democratic Alliance". However, Anatoliy Hrytsenko failed to use these resources, having become a major speaker of the party and having tied the party's standing to his personal rating. After a number of leading mass media started an informational war against "Civil Position" leader, it destroyed the party's chances to

get to the parliament. Anatoliy Hrytsenko did not offer a comprehensive vision of his team. Therefore, unlike “Samopomich”, he failed to capitalize on presence of new faces in the list.

“Opposition bloc” managed to cut the ground from under Serhiy Tyhypko’s feet. In pre-election poll his “Strong Ukraine” party regularly displayed a stable result which was above 5% threshold. The mystery may be unraveled if to have a closer look at the electorate of these parties. Most voters in the East do not go into details in order to find differences between the both. They base their choice along the line “government-opposition”, “ours-theirs”. The name was a major advantage of “Opposition bloc” as people voted not for specific individuals or the party programs, but against democratic forces which had participated in the Euromaidan. It is likely that many voters even wanted to vote for Serhiy Tyhypko, but they were sure that the politician is in “Opposition bloc” list. “Strong Ukraine” leader failed to get protesting electorate as he had not proved that he would become opposition in the parliament and had not shown clear differences between his party and “Opposition bloc”.

“Zastup” result (2.7%) turned out to be another surprise of the elections. The party was created just before the elections and is oriented towards rural residents. Due to the fact that the party is supported by a number of influential farmers, they are able to efficiently work with people in rural areas, who are disciplined voters, but are under-

“Opposition bloc” managed to overcome “Strong Ukraine” due to its name

“Zastup” prospects will depend on regional network and behavior of its speakers

represented in the polls. “Zastup” even got one MP in a single-mandate district — Valeriy Davydenko in Chernihiv region. By the way, in 2012 elections the district was taken by Oleh Lyashko, who gets most of his support from rural voters as well. “Zastup” prospects will depend on the way the party builds up its regional network, as well as behavior of its leaders and the only MP. The party may use socialist rhetoric of state support to the countryside regardless of the fact that it represents large land-owners.

Taking into account complete absence of media campaign and leaders’ focus on fight with aggressor in the East, “Right Sector” showed a considerable result. The party may count on a share of “Svoboda” electorate, as “Svoboda” got an opportunity to show itself in the government at local and national levels, but completely wasted it. Instead, “Right Sector” will have at least 2 MPs, which will ensure the party presence in Ukrainian political life.

Though Communist party did not make it to the parliament, its result is quite significant. 600 thousand people supported the party in the regions which are not its electoral strongholds. Crimea and Donbas used to play this function, but they were not represented in the elections this time. The CPU result proves that there are quite a lot of people in Ukraine who feel nostalgic after the USSR and support socialist ideas. Deterioration of CPU standing may be expected only in case there is infighting among the party leadership and financing sources dry out. These financial sources were especially potent in the times when communists cooperated with Party of the Regions.

Significant CPU result confirms that there is demand for socialist ideas in the society

The aim of the publication is to provide objective information on current political events in Ukraine and thorough analysis of major tendencies in domestic politics. Such analysis will assist in setting priorities in the process of implementing reforms in Ukraine and in evaluating quality of state decisions from the viewpoint of their impact and sustainability. Special attention is paid to evaluation of political competition in Ukraine and ability of key political players to address challenges.

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